Current Affairs- FAQ on Kudankulam issue- Part 1

Presentation to Tamilnadu Government nominees and people representatives regarding safety of KKNPP on 18‐11‐2011 in the office of District Collector, Tirunelveli by Expert Group on KKNPP constituted by Government of India.

Background

            The activities relating to the establishment of KKNPP were progressing satisfactorily till recently when a protest by a section of the local population against KKNPP started from the last week of July, 2011. From October 13, 2011, KKNPP staff could not go to Site to carry out normal functions. Presently, only a few personnel of KKNPP are attending to bare minimum surveillance work. Government of India constituted an Expert Group of 15 specialists to interact with      the officials of State Government of Tamil Nadu and spokespersons of the people in the  neighborhood to explain the factual position on various aspects of the project and to dispel the apprehensions of a section of local people through a platform, provided by the State Government.

            The Expert Group (EG) had the first meeting with the State Government nominees  and the People’s representatives on 8th of November, 2011 in the office of the District Collector, Tirunelveli. After brief introductory remarks and discussions, the people’s representatives submitted a memorandum with several points and requested the Expert Group to provide the information. During the meeting both the Expert Group and the People’s representatives agreed to work jointly to resolve the issues keeping in mind both the Welfare of People and the Welfare of the Nation.

            The Kudankulam site was evaluated by the DAE Site Selection Committee and approved after due process then prevalent in 1988. Detailed studies comprising geotechnical examination, seismo-tectonic data, safe grade level, meteorological, hydrological and other studies were carried out by the expert agencies in the country. Based on these studies, a detailed Site Evaluation Report (SER) was submitted to atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) who accorded the site clearance vide approval No.CH/AERB/KK/8486/89 dated 10.11.1989.

        The Environment Clearance was obtained from the Ministry of Environment and  Forest vide letter No.4011/1/88-1A dated 9th May, 1989, as per the Environment  Protection Act 1986 with stipulations and the same was revalidated by MoEF  vide their letter dated 06.09.2001, in which it was indicated that public hearing is not required. The stipulations are being complied with. NEERI carried out a comprehensive EIA for KK-1&2 in the year 2003. Further, a comprehensive EIA by NEERI and Public Hearing including the response to stake holders were carried out as per the EIA notification of 2006 when clearance for additional nuclear reactors was sought.

      In 1989, MoEF while granting environmental clearance, permitted for construction of plant structure within 500m of high tide line. As per CRZ notification introduced for the first time in 1991 and subsequently revised in 2011 “Projects of Department of Atomic Energy are permitted activities in CRZ areas and require obtaining environmental clearance from MoEF”.

      The Expert Group learnt that recently some members of the public residing in the vicinity of KKNPP developed certain apprehensions related to safety of the plant. It appears that these apprehensions got mainly generated as a sequel to the accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP in Japan on 11.03.2011. The preparatory work for conducting an off-site emergency exercise at KKNPP, which is required as per AERB’s safety regulations prior to loading of nuclear fuel seems to have further aggravated these apprehensions. The EG has reviewed the design safety aspects of KKNPP and have concluded that an accident similar to that occurred at Fukushima, is not conceivable at KKNPP. The root cause of the accident at Fukushima was complete loss of power supply at units 1 to 4 on account of flooding at the site caused by the tsunami. While units 1, 2 &3 got shut down automatically (unit-4 was already in shut down state with its fuel unloaded in the spent fuel pool), the cooling of their cores could not be maintained in the absence of power supply, which caused the accident. The EG has carefully examined the design of the KKNPP in this respect and finds that all safety related structures, systems and components of KKNPP are located well above the maximum flooding that can cover the site from all possible causes including tsunami. A total loss of power supply at KKNPP, unlike in the case of Fukushima, is therefore not possible. In addition, KKNPP has been provided with certain engineered safety features (ESF) like the Passive Heat Removal System. With these ESFs, the reactor core can be effectively cooled even under the condition of total loss of electric power.

The EG also noted that a very detailed and in-depth review of KKNPP that includes its siting, design and operational safety and QA aspects has been conducted by AERB over the last few years following its established multi-tier review process before issuing clearances for various stages of the Project. This review by AERB has been done through a thorough study of the design documents that run in several thousands of pages and intense discussion in a large number of meetings of its Advisory Committee on Project Safety Review of KKNPP and its specialists working groups. In addition, members of the Advisory committee and working groups have spent considerable time and effort in studying the technical material outside the formal meetings and in discussing the safety matters with NPCIL officials and with the design experts from Russian Federation. This extensive review by AERB provides assurance of the robustness of the safety design and construction of KKNPP. The commissioning program is also progressively reviewed by AERB.

Observations of Expert Group on the memorandum submitted by people Representatives

The Expert Group examined the memorandum, interacted with the KKNPP officials and visited the KKNPP for a detailed study. The observation of the Expert Group on the global trends in the use of nuclear energy for power generation, Indian experience on Nuclear Plants, Radiation in the Environment around Nuclear Plants in India and Safety Features in KKNPP are presented in Annexure-1 and the observations on the points mentioned in the memorandum are presented in Annexure-II.

The EG wishes to express that quite a few points contained in the memorandum lack clarity and consequently leads to difficulty in providing focused feedbacks. The information provided are based on the data and the documents supplied by KKNPP and NPCIL officials, on request by EG and the findings of the group members during the plant visit and interactions with the plant officials. Further clarifications can be provided on specific relevant points, if required.

The following five points in the memorandum have not been addressed by the EG since they fall outside its purview:

1. Inter‐Governmental Agreement

2. Impact on Bilateral relations between governments

3. Russian and Indian liability issues

4. NSG related issues

5. Setting up possible weapon facility at KKNPP