Current Affairs- FAQ on Kudankulam issue- Part 10

5.31) CONSERVATION ISSUES (GULF OF MANNAR BIOSPHERE AND WESTERN GHATS)

Gulf of Mannar Biosphere reserve:

·        The nearest biodiversity richness region of Gulf of Mannar biosphere reserve is located north of Tuticorin which is more than 80 Kms from the plant site.

·        CMFRI while preparing the marine EIA had conducted exhaustive sampling covering 60      Sq Kms of the site. They have clearly stated that “the marine ecosystem of the KKNPP    region has characteristics of an oceanic region which is different from the productive ecosystems of the west coast , gulfs and bays.”

     

·        Another significant ecological feature of KKNPP Site is the absence of sensitive habitats    like mangrove and coral reefs in KKNPP coast. The CMFRI have confirmed that there are          no formations of coral reefs south of Tuticorin and along the Kanyakumari coast (including the Plant neighborhood).

     

Western Ghats:

     

·        The EIA document confirms that there is no forest area within 15 km of the plant site.

·        As such there is no impact on the Western Ghat due to setting up of KKNPP.

5.32) Terrorist and Security Threats

      Elaborate measures have been taken for the security of KKNPP as is done for all the NPP in    the country. An exhaustive physical protection system with 24X7 monitoring is      implemented for the plant areas. These systems consist of multi‐layered security and        online surveillances which are regularly reviewed with regard to threat perception to ensure adequate protection.

     

5.33) Bilateral relations

      Not addressed

5.34) Impact of mining activities

No mining activity is carried out by KKNPP.

5.35) Severe Accident Management:

      NPPs are designed and operated following the principle of defense‐in‐depth. This principle requires that there be successive barriers against release of radioactivity and several layers of protection be provided for each of the safety functions.

     

      The first level of defense‐in‐depth is achieved by ensuring that the plant is designed in such a way that all safety parameters like pressure, temperature flow etc. are maintained   with in the specified limits.

      The second level corresponds to upset operating conditions that can be expected during  plant operation, like, failure of grid power supply. The design ensures that safety is not jeopardized on account of such upset conditions.

     

      The third level relates to the situation where plant parameters exceed the prescribed      safety limits. The safety design of the NPP ensures that the reactor is promptly shut down  automatically and cooling of fuel is adequately maintained to prevent it from overheating and cause any release of radioactivity.

     

      The fourth level corresponds to a situation where adequate cooling of the fuel cannot be maintained for some reason whereby the reactor gets into the accident mode. Even for such accident conditions, the NPP design provides the means to be able to control the progression of the accident and prevent any major release of radioactivity to the environment such that there are no significant adverse radiological consequences in the public domain.

     

      The fifth level of defense‐in‐depth assumes, in a hypothetical manner that due to unforeseen reasons or due to any failures in design or operating procedures or in their implementation, radioactivity release does take place. Hence an emergency preparedness plan must be in place which can be executed, if required, to mitigate the consequences of such a release.

      The emergency preparedness plans should therefore be viewed in the overall context of            the safety philosophy of defense‐in‐depth. Needless to mention that for any plan to be effective, it must be tested periodically. The emergency exercise including the off‐site emergency exercise that may require evacuation of a section of the population, are   carried out accordingly. It must, however, be reiterated that the possibility of an emergency situation arising is extremely remote and the exercises are done only to be in a state of preparedness, should the need arise.

     

      In India, NPPs have been in operation over the last more than 40 years and there has     never been any accident of the need for any emergency actions in the public domain. Even in the entire world where over 430 NPPs are in operation, the need for emergency action in the public domain has arisen only twice; once in 1986 from the Chernobyl accident and the other in 2011 from the Fukushima accident.

5.36) Emergency Preparedness at KKNPP:

      It may be noted that in KK reactor design, many advanced safety features are deployed. These include the passive heat removal system, which ensures cooling of the fuel even if power is not available (as was the case in Fukushima) and other safety provisions like the double containment and core catcher that strengthen the plant safety such that any intervention in the public domain outside the plant exclusion zone will not be required even in case of an accident. However, as a matter of abundant caution following the defense–in‐depth safety philosophy, emergency plan for actions to be taken in public domain during any off‐site emergency were prepared and provided to District Authorities.

      These procedures are accordingly included in the “Emergency Preparedness Plans” Vol‐1 and Vol‐2 duly approved for Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project. Volume– 1 covers Plant Emergency and Site Emergency conditions which have been prepared by the KKNPP Site,            reviewed and approved by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. The document no. is   I01.KK.0.0.TM.MN.WD001. Volume ‐2 is for the Off‐site Emergency Preparedness which has been prepared by NPCIL in consultation with the State authorities, concurred by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and approved by the District Collector, Tirunelveli District.  Document No. is I01.KK.0.0.TM.MN.WD002. Both of these documents are in place.

      These emergency preparedness plans brings out the conditions at which plant, site and off site emergencies may be declared by the respective authorities. They also bring out in    detail the roles and responsibilities of various agencies involved. The plants are tested periodically by conduct of emergency exercises such that any deficiency can be observed and corrected and to keep the plant updated. Plant emergency exercise is conducted once    in 3 months, site emergency is conducted once in a year. The off‐site emergency is conducted once is two years. Prior to first criticality, plant, site and off‐site emergency exercises have to be conducted once.

      For the plant and site emergency, all the KKNPP employees and the CISF personnel have been trained. First plant emergency mock exercise has been conducted involving KKNPP personnel and contract personnel.

Implementation of offsite Emergency plan involves various State Government Departments like District Revenue, Social Welfare, Fire, Health, Horticulture & Agriculture,  Fisheries, Irrigation, For est, Animal Husbandry, Electricity Board, Transport, Local Administration & Police Departments. A detailed training programme was conducted as per the schedule provided by the District Collectorate for the officials from all the above departments in the month of August 2011 about the roles and responsibilities of the respective departments.  Around 600 officials from these departments have been trained on off‐site emergency  preparedness.

      Fresh Fuel transportation will be done with due consents from AERB, following all the     stipulations.

     

      No Radioactive Waste will be transported out of the plant premises.

     

      All the above are subject to AERB approval and audit.